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Rationality and Human Logics in the Thought of Hountondji and Oluwole: Comparative Perspectives on the Status of the "Babalawo" In Yoruba Society

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Abstract

In a context of identity denial and marginalization of traditional African cultural heritage, the decolonization of knowledge emerges as an inescapable imperative. How can we defend and justify a rationality and human logic that can universally convey the production of indigenous African knowledge? The article examines the place of « Babalawo » in the philosophical thoughts of Hountondji and Oluwole, highlighting the epistemological challenges facing postcolonial Africa. Clearly? These two authors offer two distinct yet complementary perspectives that deserve to be explored, especially in the context that highlights the responsibility of african intellectuals.

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Introduction

Throughout the history of philosophy—from antiquity to the postmodern era—relativism has consistently raised one of the fundamental questions regarding the production of knowledge. Does universal knowledge exist—that is, knowledge that holds true across all times and places? Does such knowledge exist within the African tradition? Does this knowledge belong to the realm of action, or is it purely theoretical? Must we instead concede that knowledge exists only within the sphere of writing, to the exclusion of oral tradition? Should the validity of all knowledge be restricted to the specific context in which it is produced? The debate over relativism remains highly relevant in the African context. It is important to note that this debate touches upon the broader issue of rationality and human logic in the postmodern era. Indeed, the prevalence of identity-based claims—articulated through discourse—defines every people and, by extension, every culture. By focusing on

Paulin Hountondji and Sophie Oluwole as key reference points for this reflection, the aim is to present—directly and clearly—the core arguments developed by these two African thinkers. Their work addresses the rationality and human logic cultivated from time immemorial to the present day by the *Babalawo*—figures recognized as indigenous African intellectuals or sages within Yoruba society. The ultimate goal is to foster a movement toward the decolonization of knowledge, thereby elevating the production of indigenous African knowledge to a universal level. In reality, the exploration of rationality and human logic through the lens of Western thought has led to a denial of identity and the marginalization of traditional African cultural heritage. African philosophical traditions as a whole have sparked debate and enabled—to the extent possible—the unearthing of the traditional substratum that constitutes the very essence of how existential issues relevant to the African context are formulated. Indeed, the focus on Hountondji and Oluwole is highly significant in the quest

to decolonize knowledge and even deconstruct the mindsets inherent to the context of scientific research in Africa. At this crossroads, the fundamental question arises: how do Hountondji and Oluwole view the rationality and human logics developed within the African context by the *Babalawo*? Underlying this, how do they regard the status of the traditionalist African intellectuals known as *Babalawo* in Yoruba culture? The status of the *Babalawo* in the thought of Hountondji and Oluwole stands, in fact, as a symbol of the epistemological challenges facing postcolonial Africa.

Rationality, human logics, and knowledge production: the question of method

What methodological principle should be adopted regarding rationality, human logics, and knowledge production? This is a recurring question that divides thinkers, to the point of becoming the central issue justifying the marginalization of certain forms of thought. [Descartes \(1937\)](#), for instance, insisted on the necessity of introducing methodical doubt into any process of knowledge construction, asserting the following:

"In the first [Meditation], I set forth the reasons why we may generally doubt all things—and material things in particular—at least so long as we possess no foundations for the sciences other than those we have had until now. Now, although the utility of such a general doubt is not immediately apparent, it is nonetheless immense: it frees us from all manner of prejudices and paves an easy path for accustoming the mind to detach itself from the senses; ultimately, it ensures that we can no longer harbour any doubt regarding what we subsequently discover to be true." ([Descartes 1937](#), p. 162)

[Descartes \(1937\)](#) clearly outlines the fundamental methodological principle used to assess the proper formulation of knowledge. This is the heuristic principle of the unity of subject, object, and method. What, then, does this principle of unity entail? We must acknowledge the fact that, in the process of knowledge construction, rationality demands that the meaning, scope, and conceptualization of the subject-object-method triad be determined solely through the interrelationships among these three terms.

Indeed, it is based on the specific disposition of the interlocutor that the researcher-subject determines not only their relationship with that person but—above all—

the object of the research itself. In effect, generalized doubt opens the path that sets the researcher-subject in motion and leads them toward the object of research. It also establishes the foundations, norms, and conditions for the development and production of knowledge. Generalized doubt establishes—at a structural and systemic level—the criteria and conditions reflecting the requirement that the object of research cannot be grasped by just anyone, nor at just any cost. The utility of doubt is thus beyond question, insofar as it liberates the researching subject from all manner of prejudices. In this regard, [Vigan \(2011\)](#) asserts:

"Doubt does not come to the person who, believing themselves already free of all prejudice, sees no need to be liberated from it. Moreover, doubt paves an easy path for accustoming our minds to detach from the senses; yet Descartes' proposition holds no interest for the mind that has—once and for all, and resolutely—opted for a life mired in the senses." ([Vigan, 2001](#), p. 2)

When closely examining the processes of knowledge formation as conceived in Western thought, one must note that in the relationship between the researching subject and knowledge, the object that emerges is not self-evident; it is not immediately accessible to everyone. This is precisely what leads the researching subject to avoid rushing straight to the object, opting instead to pass through the stage of generalized doubt. The goal here is to ensure that the object of research becomes visible to a multitude of individual consciousnesses.

The researcher-subject's stated ambition is simply to transform an external presence—manifesting within the field of individual consciousness—into a reality that expressly demands to be communicated and shared; something that embodies a universal project: breaking the narrow confines of the individual in favour of the community. The principle of unity, articulated alongside generalized doubt, thus facilitates a transition from subjectivity to objectivity, from monologue to language, and from speech to society. The method therefore serves a multipolar function, leading [Vigan](#) to state the following:

"The social, psychological, and intellectual function of the method is to clearly articulate the possible order of reasons whereby an object—appearing in the field of a singular consciousness as both manifestation and gift—can be communicated to others and, furthermore, become for any rational person an object worthy of being desired for its own sake, representing the quality of meaning in

the existence of the people of that time and place." (Vigan, 2001, p. 2)

When this method is rigorously applied at a theoretical level, the question facing Africans in this context is whether it is possible to apply this principle of unity and generalized doubt to the *Babalawo*—figures involved in the production of traditional African endogenous knowledge—whose methods of production do not always align with so-called modern approaches. Ricoeur (1961) articulates one approach to addressing this concern when he states the following:

"While promoting humanity, the process of universalization also constitutes a kind of subtle destruction—not merely of traditional cultures (which might not be an irreparable loss), but of what I shall provisionally call (before elaborating further) the creative core of great civilizations and cultures: that core from which we interpret life, and which I term, in anticipation, the ethical-mythical core of humanity.

This is the source of the conflict; we sense that this single global civilization simultaneously exerts a wearing-down or erosive effect on the cultural heritage that shaped the great civilizations of the past. Among other troubling consequences, this threat manifests as the spread—right before our eyes—of a 'cheap' or 'tacky' civilization, a pitiful counterpart to what I earlier referred to as 'elementary culture'." (Ricoeur, 1961, pp. 445–446)

In Western culture, rationality has driven the phenomenon of universalization—a constant trend inherent to modernity—resulting in the convergence of cultures, primarily at the level of what is commonly termed "material civilization." Human logic and the production of knowledge have facilitated increasingly easy communication of all kinds and spurred the widespread diffusion of technical innovations, lifestyles, and behavioural patterns, thereby fostering growing similarities among different countries and cultures.

However, the prevailing reality seeks to relegate the indigenous African knowledge articulated by the *Babalawo* to the status of primitive and ineffective lore. Throughout history—up to recent times and even today—the dominant intellectual discourse in both the West and Africa has consistently treated subjugated cultures with haughty condescension, while persistently denying the existence of any form of logical thought or coherent logical-discursive articulation among peoples subjected to colonization.

In African universities and other research centers, a common pattern emerges: the colonization of mindsets, to the point where norms and principles established by the West are viewed as the benchmark against which the production of knowledge is measured. From Tempels' "enlightened humanism" (1948) and the acknowledgment of a philosophy tainted by a perceived practical inferiority, to what is termed "ethnophilosophy," a fundamental question arises here and now: must African *Babalawo* content themselves with a rationality granted to them by the West—a rationality seen as flawed and incomplete, forever awaiting perfection from an external source?

We must, therefore, examine the work of Hountondji—who advocates moving beyond ethnophilosophy toward a requirement for endogenous critical thought—and that of Oluwole, who highlights the oracular and symbolic logic of the *Babalawo* as a form of knowledge production in Africa. The denial of identity and the marginalization of traditional African cultural heritage call for us to turn to African thinkers who have proposed solutions to this issue. Hountondji and Oluwole have successfully defended and justified a rationality and human logic capable of elevating the production of endogenous African knowledge to a universal level.

Hountondji: from ethnophilosophy to the requirement for endogenous critical thought

The philosophical desire goes astray when it seeks to justify itself by claiming specific ancestors. Conversely, what justifies and authorizes it—by rendering it necessary—is its role as the active agent of a present liberation (achieved through theory) from the current alienation of knowledge and self-knowledge. Hountondji's stance is grounded in the imperative to initiate a transition from a collective, unconscious worldview to a theoretical discourse that is inextricably both philosophical and scientific. Taking into account the philosophy of the subject inaugurated by Descartes—which positions the West as the center of culture—Hountondji argues for the necessity of imposing rules of demarcation and delimitation to sort through the mosaic of indigenous knowledge systems. Here is what he asserts on this matter:

"I define African philosophy as a body of texts: specifically, the collection of texts written by Africans and designated by the authors themselves as philosophical. It should be noted that this definition involves no circular reasoning. Indeed, the meaning of

the label 'philosophical' does not come into play here, let alone the validity of that designation. What matters is solely the act of designation itself—the deliberate use of the word 'philosophy,' regardless of the meaning ascribed to it. In other words, our sole concern is the authors' philosophical intention, not the degree (which is difficult to assess) of its actual realization." (Hountondji, 1977, p. 12)

The clarification Hountondji provides in this way does not imply a rejection of the existence of an established and formative African body of thought articulated by the *Babalawo*. This body of texts to which Hountondji refers does indeed exist, taking the form of knowledge produced by African *Babalawo* themselves—practitioners who operate within a human framework not only of formulating the existential problems that concern them but also, and above all, of resolving those problems. In this regard, Hountondji points out that the definition he proposes does not lend itself to any sort of petition—whether originating from the West or from those who believe that African intellectuals trained in Western universities were, in reality, nothing more than mere agents of colonization.

It is, therefore, within the realm of methodological rigor that Hountondji positions himself when addressing the question of how *Babalawo* produce indigenous African knowledge. From this same perspective, Hountondji notes that what matters above all is the authors' philosophical intent—that is, the exercise of critical thought. This approach urges us not to accept everything as "thought" indiscriminately, but rather to distinguish between popular opinion—accepted as such—and critical thought capable of questioning.

As we have previously emphasized, the act of questioning requires a method; it leads to methodical doubt and points the way forward. By situating the modes of producing indigenous knowledge within the framework of methodological rigor, Hountondji seeks to imbue the process with the profound significance of hermeneutics—establishing the very foundation of what should henceforth be termed African thought or African philosophy. How, then, should we interpret the texts Hountondji discusses? What importance should be accorded, specifically, to oral discourse and African cultural phenomena? Hountondji's project aims essentially to understand and analyze the deep meanings and underlying contexts of indigenous knowledge production in Africa.

The indigenous African knowledge articulated by the *Babalawo* does indeed exist; the task, as Hountondji asserts, is to analyse and understand it by taking into account the historical and cultural contexts of its production. Having clearly outlined these general conditions, Hountondji makes the following substantive assertion: "For us, then, African philosophy is a specific body of literature. This literature undeniably exists; it takes shape in a bibliography that has been steadily expanding for nearly thirty years." (Hountondji, 1977, p. 12).

African forms of knowledge exist! This is self-evident—whether in written or oral literature. Rationality and human modes of reasoning are thus constructed on a daily basis in Africa by the *Babalawo*—today just as in the past—within both traditional and so-called modern thought. If the existence of this African thought is a given, what can it actually achieve? What is its vision, and what are its possible manifestations? Here is what Hountondji asserts:

"To circumscribe this literature, to identify its major themes, to show what has hitherto constituted it's *de facto* problematic, and to render that very problematic problematic—such is the limited aim of these few remarks. They will have achieved their goal if, by chance, we succeed in convincing our African readers that African philosophy is not to be found where we have long sought it—in some mysterious recess of our supposedly immutable soul, like a collective, unconscious worldview waiting for analysis to reveal it—but rather that our philosophy resides essentially in that very analysis, in the laborious discourse through which we have hitherto attempted to define ourselves; a discourse whose ideological nature we must acknowledge, and which we need only liberate (in the most political sense of the term) to transform into a theoretical discourse—one that is inextricably both philosophical and scientific." (Hountondji, 1977, p. 12)

Thus, Hountondji's project consisted of a stance made possible by his scientific rigor. According to Paulin Hountondji, there is no African philosophy waiting to be rediscovered beneath the dust of buried traditions. This is not to say that there is no African culture or thought. Hountondji is keen, precisely, to finally distinguish between these concepts, which have too often been conflated in discourses lacking sufficient theoretical grounding.

It is by looking ahead rather than behind that African *Babalawo* will be able to access the specific nature of the philosophical—assigning to this term the rigorous content defined by a history and a theoretical aim that did not originate on the African continent, but which Africa claims as its own, just as it appropriates other tools from the Western world. Philosophy in Africa is a matter of the present and, above all, the future; it is by no means a thing of the past. Yet it is precisely from this past that Oluwole—drawing on the *Babalawo*—derives the substance of African rationality and human logic.

Oluwole: Oracular and symbolic logic as a form of knowledge

What is to be done with this traditional African past—at once so distant and so close? Is it possible to move beyond the epistemological dilemma posed by this past and enable a universal dialogue between different modes of rationality, human logic, and knowledge production? Ricoeur emphasizes the ambivalence that characterizes reflection when it is conducted in a peremptory manner:

"The problem often presents itself as a dilemma, or even a vicious circle: the struggle against colonial powers and the fights for liberation could only be waged by asserting a distinct identity; for this struggle was driven not merely by economic exploitation, but more profoundly by the displacement of identity caused by the colonial era. It was therefore necessary, first, to rediscover this deep-seated identity, to re-root it in the past, to forge a new national soul, and to pit this spiritual and cultural claim against the identity of the colonizer." "Yet, to enter modern civilization, one must simultaneously embrace the scientific, technical, and political rationality that often demands the outright abandonment of an entire cultural past. It is a fact: not every culture can withstand and absorb the shock of global civilization. Here lies the paradox: how does one modernize while returning to one's roots? How does one awaken a dormant ancient culture and enter the civilization of the universal?" (Ricoeur, 1961, pp. 445–446)

Oluwole aligns herself largely with the approach that advocates for rediscovering African identity by drawing upon its profound inner character. Here, the recourse to the past is methodical, leading to a grounding in indigenous African cultural heritage. Indeed, Oluwole proposes that Africans reconstruct an African identity and soul, asserting this spiritual and cultural claim in the face of Western thought. The question arising from this

stance is whether the dilemma concerning rationality and human logic in the African context must necessarily be resolved by choosing exclusively between the positions proposed by Hountondji and Oluwole. Should we view it in strictly disjunctive terms—past versus future, tradition versus modernity—or should we seek to transcend the issue by moving beyond this either-or framework? For her part, Oluwole proposes drawing upon the traditional African cultural repertoire to demonstrate how the major transformations driving the production of indigenous knowledge occur, without becoming bogged down in sterile contradictions. By setting out to establish a normative comparison between Socrates and Orunmila, Oluwole highlights the foundational significance of African Yoruba literature. The account Oluwole offers is as follows:

"A comparison between Socrates and Orunmila must surely seem strange to the ears of most people educated in the Western tradition, including Africans themselves; Socrates is a renowned philosopher, universally recognized in world literature, whereas Orunmila appears as an obscure mythological figure—seemingly emerging from nowhere and failing to resonate intellectually within African philosophy, a discipline still in search of its own identity." (Oluwole, 2000, p. 87)

Far from positing an equality between Western and African modes of thought, this bold comparison is intended rather as a deliberate effort to articulate the existence of an African literature—one made explicit through the figure of Orunmila. However, this formulation remains problematic in light of various speculative considerations:

"Some ethnologists and anthropologists—though mostly just those who have heard of Orunmila as the Yoruba 'god' of divination—might take issue with this. Philosophers who advocate a Western-oriented approach to resolving the long-standing debate over the existence of African philosophy would likely feel indignant at this seemingly fraudulent attempt to elevate a local mythological figure to the intellectual status of the globally recognized 'Grand Patron' of Western philosophy." (Oluwole, 2000, p. 87)

Oluwole criticizes the attitude of African intellectuals who have yet to grasp the need to promote knowledge production within Africa.

"This attitude is understandable, given the modern dichotomies drawn between intellectual traditions and

folklore, religion and philosophy, critical thought and intuitive wisdom, and written and oral traditions. It is precisely these long-established classifications—and the arguments used to support them—that this work challenges, seeking to demonstrate that they are fundamentally misguided and, consequently, anti-intellectual." (Oluwole, 2000, p. 88)

Once articulated, Oluwole's warning leads to a discussion of the consequences of this denial of identity regarding traditional African thought. For Oluwole:

"The hypothesis is that the disparagement of the indigenous African philosophical tradition—labeling it merely as mythology and folk wisdom—has deprived the intellectual world of the benefits of viable literary traditions. These traditions gave expression to art, social principles, philosophies, and coherent worldviews that define intellectual identities." (Oluwole, 2000, p. 88)

Oluwole therefore explicitly calls for the consideration of indigenous African literature as the medium for expressing African thought—thought articulated in essence by the *Babalawo*, who are, in reality, the custodians of Orunmila. For Oluwole, comparing Socrates and Orunmila is far from a futile exercise; rather, it serves as the starting point for articulating the existence of indigenous African bodies of knowledge, of which Orunmila—like Socrates—is the supreme guardian.

"By an irony of history, Socrates and Orunmila are two of the rare ancient thinkers who appear to us in the 'flesh.' Both lived around 500 BCE; both were described as 'unattractive' and bore the same title: 'Father of Philosophy' or 'Father of Wisdom.' Socrates and Orunmila engaged others in dialogues employing allegories and myths.

Both expressed themselves through an 'intoxicating blend' of poetry and prose, making it difficult for scholars to disentangle their secular literary statements from their religious doctrines, or their metaphors and witticisms from their serious philosophical thought." (Oluwole, 2000, p. 90)

As disciples of Orunmila, *Babalawos* are Ifa priests and diviners who are trained within and dedicated to the Yoruba community of Nigeria. In traditional Yoruba society, a *Babalawo* is simultaneously a physician, a pharmacist, an herbalist, a psychiatrist, and a social mediator recognized and respected by his people.

The *Babalawo* effectively contributes to the shaping of "the human within the man." Regarding the nature of the *Babalawo*'s role, his unique position in Yoruba society is attained neither through lineage nor through honour; the status of *Babalawo* is acquired only after many years of rigorous study and experience.

Admittedly, the knowledge produced by *Babalawos* does not operate on the same plane as that of modern researchers. In reality, the *Babalawo* serves as a bridge between two worlds: the ephemeral and the eternal, the material and the spiritual. He exerts considerable influence on the fabric of social life within Yoruba communities. Clearly, the *Babalawo* is the custodian of sacred knowledge transmitted by Orunmila, and he demonstrates his ability to communicate with the divine on a daily basis through complex rituals and the manipulation of sacred objects. It is precisely this mode of operation—centered on the production of indigenous African knowledge—that distinguishes *Babalawos* from Western scholars, even though their ultimate objectives are the same.

Moreover, *Babalawos* do not limit themselves solely to predicting the future; they also act as moral advisors who play an effective role in fostering harmonious coexistence within their societies. Thus, the knowledge articulated by *Babalawos* encompasses the care of the sick, the resolution of crises and conflicts, the establishment of moral guidelines, environmental protection, proper conduct, and the transmission and preservation of indigenous cultures.

The knowledge produced by *Babalawos* has made them vehicles for transmitting indigenous cultural heritage—which shapes the daily personality of individuals within the social group—thereby preserving an African intangible heritage renowned for its richness and depth.

Putting it into perspective: modern-day *Babalawos* and the quest for meaning

Hountondji and Oluwole have paved the way; It is time for researchers in African universities—those who can now be unequivocally termed the "Babalawo" of modern times—to assume their responsibilities. Clearly, one function of trivialization is to remove concepts from the realm of reflection and methodical analysis. Indeed, the formulation of hypotheses regarding indigenous African knowledge systems is not immune to this trend of trivialization within African university research centers.

The mapping of systemic relationships between so-called modern Western thought and traditional—or indigenous—African thought sparks conflicting stances even among the African elite, who are ostensibly tasked with elevating indigenous African knowledge to the level of universality.

In this context, we face—with particular historical urgency—challenges linked to the modes of producing indigenous African knowledge, the state of scientific research in African universities, and the question of African identity. Fundamentally, the aim is to reflect on the characteristics and stakes of the research environment in African universities, the modalities and implications of internal and external funding, and the tensions inherent in the strategic choices made by both researchers and African policymakers.

By definition, research consists of a body of studies and work conducted methodically by a specialist with the aim of advancing knowledge. It is a long process characterized by its systematic and rigorous nature, leading to the acquisition of new knowledge. In the normal course of events, the functions of research are to describe, explain, understand, control, and predict facts, phenomena, and behaviours. Scientific rigor is guided by the notion of objectivity—meaning that the researcher deals only with facts, within a framework defined by the scientific community.

The "Babalawo" of African universities must build a bridge between African endogenous knowledge production models and so-called modern science—not through sterile comparison, but rather through a vision of complementarity that places humanity at the heart of knowledge production. We must foster an individual and collective awareness—engaging, first and foremost, all stakeholders in the pursuit of this complementarity—by raising a number of questions:

What is the current state of the underlying motivations behind the creation of research centers in African universities? What role does research into African endogenous knowledge play within these universities? To what extent have the results of research conducted in these centers contributed to the sustainable development of African countries? What potential solutions can be envisioned for the future? What are the various models of research funding in African universities? What tensions arise—in terms of responsibility—regarding the capacities and modalities of internal and external funding for these research centers?

"The challenge here, as Jomo Kenyatta demonstrated in his famous work **Facing Mount Kenya**, is not merely to interpret the world but to act upon its contradictions and transform it based on an accurate analysis." In Africa, the idea of establishing universities and research centers sparks a recurring debate concerning the capacity—or lack thereof—of Africans to harness the potential of the mind to address the existential challenges facing their fellow citizens. Research in Africa: For whom? By whom? And for what specific purpose? This is the challenge arising from the failure of research policies inspired by a vision that does not always align with the actual needs observed on the ground. Upon closer inspection, the educational systems established in Africa in the wake of independence remain problematic to this day. Universities operate based on a logic of merely absorbing and extending secondary education streams, rather than functioning as research institutions—that is, as engines of innovation capable of addressing the fundamental needs of African people. Following decolonization, the continent's opening to the West entrenched states modelled on foreign patterns; at the heart of political and economic power stood indigenous intellectuals who, "armed with their universalism, brought back from the universities of the metropole an attitude entirely aliens to the concrete reality of their people" (Nkrumah, 1976). The adoption of Western values by African intellectuals—often at the expense of the socio-economic realities of their own environments—creates a problem. It is within the spheres of education and research that the seeds of underdevelopment are sown in Africa: "no concrete assessment of the populations' actual needs was conducted before embarking—with eyes turned outward—on the hitherto unknown path of development" (Nouhouayi, 1990). Unfortunately, the proliferation of universities and research centres across Africa has failed to provide lasting solutions to known fundamental problems—solutions that could have been achieved by integrating the indigenous knowledge held by figures such as the **Babalawo** into the continent's ongoing development process.

In this regard, Hountondji points out that:

"today, as in the past, the demand for theory comes from elsewhere, just as the demand for economics does. The science practiced in former colonies remains dependent—even down to its problematics and the very questions it asks—on the scientific concerns and, consequently, the economic and technological needs of the West" (Hountondji, 2001).

In concluding this comparative look at rationality and human logic within the thought of Hountondji and Oluwole, it is worth emphasizing that both thinkers explicitly call upon researchers in African universities to break free from the logic of extroversion and the outsourcing of knowledge production. Research into the production of endogenous knowledge by *Babalawo* is still in its infancy. Indeed, university research in Africa does not always translate into theoretical or practical solutions for the concrete existential problems faced by the African populations concerned.

Research in universities and other centers relies heavily on international funding. In Africa, "domestic funding remains low, and African research depends heavily on international aid, in which philanthropy plays a major role"—a situation that poses a serious obstacle to the vaporization of African endogenous knowledge.

"No country in the world can develop without relying on strong, autonomous national research to devise its own responses to its development challenges" (Aiglepiere & Botton, 2020). Africans must urgently break away from the logic of dependency, extroversion, and outsourcing. Any research activity within a country falls within the realm of national sovereignty and the cultural and identity-related sphere of its citizens. A sense of responsibility calls upon African researchers to rethink research objectives, steering them toward the generation of indigenous African knowledge. Since research centers on humanity and its surroundings, it is essential to consider the dimension of responsibility toward people, the environment, and historical trajectories. We must

devise our own solutions to our development challenges through responsible research in Africa.

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